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Channing Arndt and Finn Tarp*
Abstract
Aid and aid institutions constitute an important element of the global response to interlinked global
developmental and environmental challenges. As such, these institutions are now being drawn into new
arenas beyond the traditional focus on improving the livelihoods of poor people in low-income countries.
Development aid, by itself, cannot “save the planet.” Nevertheless, development aid and development
institutions do have the potential to become important catalytic actors in achieving developmental and
global environmental objectives. This requires bold reforms and political action. Without appropriate
restructuring of the international institutional architecture to confront the new development context
combined with the necessary complementary policy frameworks, future aid, including aid for
environmental objectives, risks substantially under-performing.
1. Introduction
We focus here on the implications of global environmental change in general and
climate change in particular for the international institutional architecture as it
relates to the conduct of foreign assistance. The paper is designed to serve as a
capstone to this special issue with the aim of bringing together the existing pieces
of evidence in a new and coherent manner and drawing out what can be said at this
juncture. A common theme is that aid and aid institutions constitute an important
element of the global response to interlinked global developmental and
environmental challenges. The process of engaging aid institutions in addressing
interlinked environmental and developmental challenges has recently been
formalized in the form of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) approved by
the United Nations General Assembly in September 2015. While formal goals have
been established,1 the means for achieving them remain as work in progress. The
same goes for the 230 indicators associated with the goals as well as assessment of
the potential tradeoffs between goals. Here, we argue that substantial institutional
reforms are required to confront environmental challenges alongside traditional
development challenges amid a new geography of poverty and fragility.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the context in
which development aid operates emphasizing both the continuation of traditional
goals centered on poverty reduction (see SDG 1) and the emergence of new goals,
frequently driven by environmental concerns (such as SDG 13). Section 3 considers
how the aid system has responded to this new context with particular emphasis on
initiatives designed to confront environmental challenges. Agriculture sits at the
core of traditional development issues (and hence aid) and the sector also has
strong environmental implications. It both impacts and is impacted by climate.
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Agriculture is therefore treated as a cross-cutting issue in sections 2 and 3.
Section 4 then considers the future role of aid with emphasis on environment and
climate change. This section contains five lessons for the future role of foreign
assistance. A final section reasserts the need for bold reform of the existing aid
institutional structure and for equally bold policy initiatives in order to meet
development challenges of the 21st century.
2. The Context
Since about 1960, aid has sought to improve the economic and social conditions of
poor people; and a wide range of key indicators of well-being have improved
markedly during that time span. Notable improvements have been registered in, for
example, per capita gross domestic product (GDP), consumption poverty, infant
mortality, life expectancy and educational attainment. The role of aid in bringing
about these improvements has over the years been the subject of much debate. In a
review of recent studies, Arndt et al. (2015b) find that the scales in this debate have
tipped in favor of aid since 2008. The bulk of the available up-to-date evidence
points to positive and significant results. They conclude that aid has contributed
positively to economic growth and to a host of other economic and social
indicators. The recent literature also highlights the long time frames (three decades
or more) required for positive impacts to materialize and that there is a significant
heterogeneity of experience, particularly over the shorter time frames sometimes in
focus (e.g., Djankov et al., 2008).2
In spite of these positive results, ample development challenges remain. With
respect to the traditional concerns of poverty, vulnerability, food security and
marginalization, about 900 million people are absolutely poor in today’s world
(down from about two billion people in 1990). In addition, 36 countries continue to
be mired in low-income status (down from 63 countries in 2000). The Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) characterizes an even larger
number of states (47), as fragile, implying that some middle-income countries are
characterized as fragile (OECD, 2012).
The contours of the development challenge are also changing. The remaining
group of low-income and fragile states likely represent a core of more difficult cases
where reliance on standard development recipes may not be sufficient. Importantly,
owing to the graduation of many states to middle-income status, the geography of
poverty has shifted. Not long ago, the vast bulk of absolutely poor people lived in
low-income countries. Today, about three out of four absolutely poor persons live
in middle-income countries.
Finally, huge environmental challenges overlay and interact with more traditional
development challenges. Humanity now confronts a series of environmental
challenges grouped under the rubric of global environmental change. Climate
change is a leading element given its potential to transform the environment of the
planet and its role as a driver behind other environmental issues such as
biodiversity loss and ocean acidification (World Bank, 2012). Formal analysis of the
distribution of likely climate outcomes by Webster et al. (2012), based on
unconstrained or only mildly constrained emissions, imply a near certainty of
temperature rises associated with ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system’ (United Nations, 1992) and a disturbingly high probability of
extreme, potentially catastrophic, temperature outcomes in the latter half of this
century (Weitzman, 2011). It is widely recognized that developing countries, with
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their high climate sensitivity and relatively low adaptive capacity, are likely to be
particularly vulnerable to climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), 2014a,c; Parry et al., 2007). Finally, responses to traditional
development challenges and responses to environmental challenges may not be
consistent with each other such as expansion of purchased input use in agriculture.
Developing countries are also crucial to any successful global mitigation strategy.
Figure 1 provides a perspective on emission levels, trends and shares. The
importance of middle-income and newly developed countries in global annual
emissions on a production basis emerges clearly from the figure. In 2010, traditional
developed countries, indicated here as members of the OECD in 1990, accounted
for about 28% of global emissions and international transport for about 2%. The
remaining 70%, or approximately 35 gigatons of CO2 equivalent per year, is
emitted elsewhere. Asia, driven heavily by rapid growth of emissions in China,
particularly since 2000, is the largest emitting region. The general trend increase in
global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is also strongly apparent. Finally, since
1970, the large majority (about 88%) of the growth in emissions has occurred
outside the countries that were members of the OECD in 1990.
In order to stabilize the climate, the trends in emissions reported in Figure 1
must quickly cease rising and then bend downwards. According to Working Group
III of the Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2014b), achieving a 50% probability of
preventing temperatures from rising by more than 2.0 degrees Celsius requires that
global emissions in 2050 (in CO2 equivalent) decline by between 25% and 55%
relative to the level observed in 2010. Basic mathematics then dictates that, even if
the traditional group of developed countries eliminated emissions entirely by 2050,
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Figure 1. Greenhouse gas emissions in CO2 equivalent per year by region [Colour
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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the rest of the world, comprised mainly of developing countries, would have to hold
emissions at approximately 2010 levels in order to attain the low end of the range
of required emission reductions. Furthermore, if this lower end of the range is
targeted, net emissions must decline steeply after 2050 reaching negative net
emissions (net CO2 sequestration) in the second half of the 21st century.
In response to this mitigation challenge, a global mitigation process has begun to
take shape. At the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, which took place in Paris in December 2015,
countries pledged Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to
reductions in emissions. There are, as of June 2016, 162 INDCs listed on the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) website. Taken as a
whole, the reductions in emissions offered in the INDCs represent a decisive break
from past trends. Recent analysis by the International Energy Agency (2015) of the
offers indicates that nearly every country will have a strong focus on the mitigation of
emissions, driving clean energy to more than 50% of world energy by 2040.
In short, the degree of global environmental transformation depends on the pace
and nature of transformation of GHG emitting activities, notably energy but also
other domains such as agriculture, forestry and land use. In determining this
balance of transformations, the countries of the traditional developing world are the
decisive players.
The international institutional architecture for fomenting development has, over
the past 50 years, faced daunting development challenges and has delivered, at
scale, in helping to meet these challenges. As noted, this architecture now confronts
a series of relatively novel and interlocking developmental and environmental
challenges. Successfully confronting these challenges will require new approaches
and a repurposed institutional architecture. In the next section, we consider the
response to date of the system to emerging environmental challenges with
particular emphasis on climate change.
3. The Response to Date
The particular forms of response to date of aid institutions to global environmental
challenges generally and climate change in particular can be divided into three
groups:
• Enhance the profile of environmental considerations in aid flows;
• Launch institutional initiatives; and
• Reform existing institutions in order to better address environmental issues.
In the following subsections, we briefly describe and assess each of these responses
of foreign aid in turn. For purposes of tractability, we opt to focus on efforts at
climate change adaptation within the context of enhancing the profile of
environmental considerations. Discussion of efforts at reducing emissions
(mitigation) is located under the heading of the launching of institutional initiatives.
Finally, we focus on agriculture as a case study in the reform of existing institutions.
Enhance the Profile of Environmental Considerations in Existing Aid Operations
Three major trends emerge from an analysis of a detailed dataset encompassing
more than US$5.4 trillion in official government assistance in over a million project/
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activity records pulled together by aiddata.org (Marcoux et al., 2013). First, aid
flows have been trending towards more environmental assistance for more than
three decades. The change is substantial with the ratio of aid characterized as
“dirty” to aid characterized as “environmental” falling from about eight in the early
1990s to roughly three in 2008. Second, environmental aid has been increasingly
coming from bilateral sources. In 2000, bilateral aid represented about half of the
US$10 billion (real US$2000) categorized as environmental aid. By 2008, bilateral
aid represented about two-thirds of the US$15billion (real US$2000) categorized as
environmental aid. Finally, funding has recently been shifting from local
environmental issues to supra-national environmental issues, such as climate
change. Roughly US$2 billion (real US$2000) was allocated annually in supra-
national environmental aid between 1990 and 2005. This amount has recently
increased to nearly US$6 billion (real US$2000), accounting for roughly 40% of
total environmental assistance.
Data from aiddata.org also indicate that within the scope of traditional
development institutions projects designed to assist developing countries in their
efforts to adapt to climate change have formed a significant portion of the recent
trend towards more environmentally oriented assistance while efforts to reduce
emissions (mitigation) have tended to concentrate under the new institutional
initiatives discussed in the next subsection.
From the perspective of aid allocations for adaptation, the following two
interrelated questions are pertinent:
(1) When are serious climate change development impacts likely to be felt?
(2) What are the best adaptation options from a development perspective?
The timing of climate change impacts is a matter of debate. Consider, for
example, the debate on the implications of climate change for agricultural yields.
This debate has the virtue of being relatively well developed and, hence, usefully
illustrates a series of fundamental issues. We begin with those finding strong
impacts on agriculture and agricultural production in the relatively near term, and
then turn to studies that suggest more modest impacts.
For Africa, Working Group II’s contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment (AR4) states that “projected reductions
in yield in some countries could be as much as 50 per cent by 2020, and crop net
revenues could fall by as much as 90 per cent by 2100, with small farmers being the
most affected” (Parry et al., 2007). Lobell et al. (2011) use experimental station
data on maize field trials in Africa and conclude that “roughly 65 per cent of
present maize-growing areas in Africa would experience yield losses for 1°C of
warming (very likely to occur prior to 2050) under optimal rain-fed management.”
The counterfactual in both cases is relative to a “no climate change” baseline.
Hence, Lobell et al. (2011) are not necessarily arguing that absolute yields will be
lower in future. Rather, they are arguing that yields will be lower than they would
be if warming were not to occur. Nevertheless, these are large impacts.
In contrast, Ringler et al. (2010) report reductions in maize yields in sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) relative to a “no climate change scenario” of about 5% on average as
a result of climate change by 2050 using process-based crop models developed by
the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Impacts on other crops
vary from stronger (root crops, such as cassava and yams) to slight or mildly
positive (rice, millet and sorghum). These estimates are not outliers. The recently
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released Fifth Assessment [AR5] (IPCC, 2014c) projects declines in yields in
tropical climates of between 0% and 2% per decade and these declines only
become likely from the 2030s (once again relative to a no climate change baseline).
These are much smaller impacts and these impacts may be further tempered by
carbon fertilization, which has frequently been excluded from process-based studies
and is nearly impossible to incorporate into statistical analyses such as those
conducted by Lobell et al (2011). It bears repeating that this debate focuses on
relatively short term impacts—out to about 2050. The AR5 points out that
substantial yield declines are possible under the higher levels of warming that may
occur in the latter half of the 21st century.
Agriculture is not the only channel through which climate change may affect
developing countries. Recent assessments combine a series of known impact
channels and consider growth and development implications out to 2050. These
assessments conclude that, while expected climate change is likely to negatively
affect overall growth/development with strong negative effects for some sectors and
regions, climate change is unlikely to derail development prospects as traditionally
conceived at least over the next three decades or so (World Bank, 2009, 2010;
Arndt et al., 2012). These three assessments rely on crop modeling approaches
similar to those of Ringler et al. (2010). They also ignore impact channels where
information has been highly fragmentary, such as implications for human health.
Greater reductions in crop yields or the failure to incorporate an important impact
channel would result in larger macroeconomic effects with lower income
households likely to suffer more.
The broad ranges in estimates of developmental impacts, even in the relatively
well developed domain of implications for agriculture, highlight the potential
pitfalls associated with adaptation policies. Consider only the quantity and
distribution of rainfall. Should one prepare for more or less precipitation? Science
gives no certain answer. Unfortunately, while the attention accorded to climate
change adaptation has solid foundations, the best adaptation policies are far from
clear. The possibilities for “mal-adaptation”—especially preparing for one climate
future when a different future may actually occur—are substantial. As a result, it
is not always clear that shifting from traditional development priorities to
identified or suggested adaptation priorities is in practice the best adaptation
policy.
In order to cope with these uncertainties and avoid “mal-adaptation,” emphasis
in recent work has been placed on flexible and robust policies that provide benefits
across a broad range of potential climate futures (Hallegatte, 2009; World Bank,
2009, 2010; Arndt and Thurlow, 2013). Policies and aid programs that allocate
greater attention to agricultural research, regional river basin management and
vulnerability of infrastructure to extreme events are likely to provide benefits across
a broad array of climate futures, and in a variety of both low- and middle-income
countries.
More generally, because more developed societies typically have the human and
institutional capabilities to cope with shocks and to take advantage of new
opportunities, it may well be that the best adaptation to climate change, alongside
the flexible and robust policies mentioned above, is rapid development that leads to
a more flexible and resilient society. Countries that reach the middle of the 21st
century with large shares of their populations engaged in subsistence agriculture,
substantial illiteracy and lethargic institutions, may face grim prospects indeed. This
is especially true if the global community fails to develop a fair and effective
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mitigation policy. As such, the adaptation agenda, in significant measure, reinforces
the existing aid and development agenda.
The vast uncertainties associated with climate change underscore, in particular,
the importance of two already prominent items on the aid and development
agenda. They are:
(1) Human capital accumulation: A more educated populace is more likely to be
able to adapt to the challenges posed by global change, whatever they turn out
to be. Chen and He (2013) find that educational improvements can translate
directly into heightened climate change mitigation and adaption.
(2) Flexible and competent public and private institutions: within any given
country, a particular sector or a particular set of regions may be negatively
affected, while other sectors or regions may be stimulated.
The basic premise is that a more educated populace, supported by flexible and
competent public and private institutions, will be better able to react to the
differential implications of climate change as they present themselves. This
resiliency to climate change will also apply to confronting other developmental and
environmental challenges (Moberg and Simonsen, 2011).
However, even aggressive adaptation policies cannot endlessly substitute for
mitigation policies. By approximately the end of this century, warming levels well
above 3–4 degrees Celsius are likely on an unconstrained emissions trajectory.
Levels of warming with potentially catastrophic implications are clearly possible.
Consequently, there is strong interest in mitigation. This mitigation imperative has
been a driving (or the driving) force behind a series of institutional aid-related
initiatives, to which we now turn.
Institutional Initiatives
We focus here on four aid-related initiatives:
(1) Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+),
(2) Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),
(3) Global Environment Facility (GEF) and
(4) Green Climate Fund (GCF).
REDD+ seeks to compensate countries for emission reductions achieved through
reduced deforestation (see Angelsen, 2013). The CDM allows agents in developed
countries to purchase emission reductions in developing countries in the hope of
simultaneously reducing emissions and spurring sustainable development. GEF is a
more traditional aid vehicle, providing a package of grant funding and technical
assistance. The GCF emerged out of the 2009 Conference of the Parties (CoP)
meeting in Copenhagen as a major initiative to facilitate financial flows from
developed to developing countries in order to meet climate challenges. The GCF
was forecast to reach US$100 billion per year in financing by 2020 (see UNU-
WIDER (2014b) for more detailed summaries).
From the perspective of aid and aid institutions as well as development more
broadly, two shared aspects of these four institutional initiatives merit mention.
(1) The main focus is not on low-income countries. The REDD+ initiative is, in
considerable measure, dictated by the location of forests. For example,
AID, ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE 291
© 2017 UNU-WIDER. Review of Development Economics Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Angelsen (2013) details the cases of Brazil and Indonesia. With respect to the
CDM, more than half of all CDM projects have taken place in China
(UNFCCC, 2012). The vast array of projects undertaken by the GEF is
weighted towards middle-income countries. Finally, the GCF only recently
began operations. However, as with the other funds, the mandate of the GCF
would lead to a frequent focus on middle-income countries.
(2) Second, the dearth of public policies designed to limit GHG emissions, at least
prior to the agreement reached in Paris at CoP21, has strongly limited the
effectiveness of all four initiatives. The functioning of REDD+ is limited by a
lack of demand for emission reductions. This has catalyzed a shift towards an
entity with features more in common with traditional development assistance
(Angelsen, 2013). For the CDM, demand uncertainty for certified emission
reductions is the major issue discussed in the 2012 annual report of the
Executive Board of the CDM. If nobody demands certified emission reductions,
then the CDM ceases to function. The GCF is, at the moment, operating far
below the US$100 billion per year originally envisaged. Proceeds from a carbon
tax are meant to be a major source of finance for the GCF by 2020. Finally, the
GEF was never designed to finance the major transformations required to
achieve sustainable emission levels. Rather, the GEF envisions a role in
“crowding in” complementary private sector and local finance in order to drive
the transformation process. Complementary public policies, such as a price on
GHG emissions, would greatly facilitate the ability of GEF to play its
envisioned role.
Because the public policy basis for emission reductions has been largely absent,
these initiatives have functioned at levels far below those required to make
significant contributions to meeting the mitigation challenge. Nevertheless, these
four initiatives represent a major share of the international response to date. The
lack of a public policy basis has been particularly pernicious in circumscribing the
ability of these initiatives to “crowd in” non-official, particularly private sector,
funds. This is a key result, stated clearly by Vandeweerd et al. (2012):
. . . actions to promote low-emission and climate-resilient development must be largely
public policy-based and private-sector financed where international public finance is
used catalytically alongside much larger capital flows. (p. 2)
As a consequence of the missing public policy basis, it is difficult to evaluate
whether these initiatives could in practice help catalyze a long-run process of
transformation at the scale required while still leaving space for low- and middle-
income countries to achieve more traditional development goals.
Nevertheless, the fundamentals behind the four initiatives appear to be sound.
Forestry is increasingly regarded as a promising relatively low-cost source for
emission reductions, which is relevant to REDD+ (Hertel, 2013a,b; Reilly et al.,
2013). An increased reliance on renewable energy sources likely favors regions with
more sun, wind and unexploited hydropower potential. These regions are frequently
located in developing countries, providing a basic rationale for the CDM. There are
manifestly enormous technical and policy challenges associated with transitioning to
cleaner energy sources providing a rationale for the GEF, and the basic idea behind
the GCF, dedicating a portion of carbon tax revenues to help catalyze investment
in low carbon sustainable development, is appealing.
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These and other institutions have also been gaining valuable experience in the
opportunities and challenges associated with fostering the institutional and technical
innovations that will be required to simultaneously achieve developmental and
environmental objectives (Hultman et al., 2012). For example, both REDD+ and
the CDM confront substantial challenges in information provision and analysis.
Specifically, are REDD+ and CDM programs actually reducing emissions on net
and are they doing so in a cost effective manner? Focusing on the CDM, a
substantial literature now exists that considers the success of the CDM in actually
reducing emissions (see, e.g. Schneider, 2007; Sutter and Parre~no, 2007; Rosendahl
and Strand, 2009; Larson et al., 2010; L€utken, 2011). As credible monitoring of
emissions will form a crucial part of any successful global accord to stabilize the
global climate, the experience that is being obtained is likely to be useful in
domains well beyond the traditional realms of development assistance.
With the successful conclusion of CoP21 in Paris, at least three of these
institutions have the potential to apply the experience they have gained in a more
favorable public policy environment. REDD+, the GEF and the GCF should play
important roles in helping developing countries meet the emission objectives stated
in their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to the reduction of
emissions agreed to in Paris at CoP21. Given the firmer public policy basis for
emission reductions, more robust evaluations of the performance of these funds is
likely to be possible within the next few years.
The short to medium term outlook for the CDM is considerably more murky.
The CDM was established under the Kyoto Protocol, which has now been
effectively superseded by CoP21. As discussed in Arent et al. (2017), countries are
likely to apply a broad array of approaches to meeting their INDCs as pledged at
CoP21. While useful for achieving agreement, this system of individual countries
establishing their own emission goals as well as the steps to achieving them does
not appear to be immediately conducive to the trading of international emissions.
As emphasized above, trading of emissions has a role in efficiently distributing
mitigation efforts, but the existing institutional system for realizing these gains, the
CDM, may disappear alongside the Kyoto Protocol, and it is not clear how to
incorporate a trading mechanism such as the CDM within the framework set up
under the Paris Agreement from CoP21. Devising a reasonably liquid system for
international emission trading currently sits on the “to do” list.3
Also on the negative side, these four initiatives are emblematic of the trend
towards international fund proliferation in response to specific needs, which appears
to be the current institutional response mode, especially to climate change. This
mode is unlikely to be the best solution. While climate finance is not the only area
subject to fund proliferation, it is a fertile one. The web site climatefundsupdate.org
lists, as of June 2016, 27 distinct climate-related funds.
As Arndt and Bach (2011) point out, fund proliferation reflects, at least in part, a
lack of consensus on governing structures and distribution mechanisms. While
developed countries have preferred using existing structures (notably the World
Bank/GEF structure with respect to climate finance), many developing countries
have preferred creating new structures with a more balanced representation and
more direct distribution mechanisms. These tensions are evident in both climate
finance and traditional development assistance. The general principle of direct
access is in line with the Paris and Accra Declarations on aid efficiency, and the
creation of these funds is in line with the desire from developing countries for new
governance structures as mentioned above. In addition, as noted, new funds,
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particularly in the climate space, are often directed towards middle-income
countries whose capacity to deal with multiple funds is likely to be higher relative
to low-income countries. Nevertheless, overall, the fund proliferation phenomenon
represents an increased fragmentation of development finance with potentially
negative implications for aid effectiveness (see also Bevan, 2012).
Finally, these four institutions are also indicative of the gravity-like force that the
climate change challenge exerts on the international institutional architecture.
When the focus is on mitigation and energy system transformation, the most
obvious and immediate needs are concentrated in rapidly developing and
industrializing middle-income economies. Hence, the focus on middle-income
economies noted above. In this sense, climate finance potentially diverts attention
from the poverty focus that historically has guided the work of many aid agencies.
This brings us to institutional reforms.
Reforming Existing Institutions
Agriculture lies at the confluence of the sustainable development agenda.
Agriculture is:
• critical for growth, food security and poverty reduction;
• strongly influenced by population growth and diet upgrading;
• impacted by climate change;
• potentially a source of low emissions energy via biofuels;
• one of the two major drivers towards surpassing the planetary boundaries
identified by Rockstr€om et al. (2009) (because of its role as a source of emissions
and other pollutants through inputs, production practices and land use change);
and
• a potential emissions sink through reforestation and sustainable land
management.
Of the 17 sustainable development goals, agriculture (broadly defined to include
the food system) will play a critical role in the achievement of at least 12 of them.
At least in the relatively short to medium term, achieving economic goals such as
eliminating poverty and hunger and increasing economic growth rates in developing
countries to 7% per annum is likely to conflict with achievement of environmental
goals, such as reducing GHG emissions and marine pollution. Because agriculture is
so integral to achieving traditional development objectives and addressing
environmental challenges, we focus on agriculture in this section.
In light of the very substantial challenges facing agriculture, Hertel (2013b)
argues that “pinning down technological progress [in agriculture] is the key to
understanding the long-run trajectory of the agricultural sector, food prices, and
global land use.” Rapid technological progress in agriculture would also provide
space for the simultaneous achievement of often conflicting economic and
environmental goals.
From an institutional perspective, it is important to highlight that there are
powerful reasons to believe that efforts at achieving technological progress should
give heavy weight to developing countries.
• First, Fischer et al. (2014, ch. 8) highlight that farm yields in developing
countries, particularly those in Africa, are often a small fraction of potential
yields. Closing these yield gaps requires substantial investment in rural
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infrastructure; however, under the right conditions (such as access to reliable
markets), efforts to reduce yield gaps offer the potential for yield growth at
much faster rates than recent growth in potential yield. Given the size of the
yield gap, these rapid growth rates could persist for a considerable period of time
(two or more decades).
• Second, because population growth and diet upgrading will be concentrated
almost exclusively in developing countries, the vast majority of the growth in the
demand for food will also be concentrated in developing countries. Food is most
logically produced near potential demand sources. Again, Africa looms large in
population projections and potentially in diet upgrading. According to the UN
medium variant population projections, Africa will account for about half of
global population growth between 2010 and 2050, by which time, nearly one in
four people on the planet will be African. If the current economic growth rates
that are being experienced on the African continent persist (or accelerate) and
the benefits of this growth are reasonably well shared, then rapid diet upgrading
is highly likely to occur as well.
Historically, agriculture has produced some clear and large successes attributable
to foreign assistance. For example, the Consultative Group for International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is credited with developing the technologies that
enabled the “green revolution” in Asia from the 1960s. More recent assessments of
the returns to agricultural research generally find high returns (Hazell, 2010; Hurley
et al., 2014; Alene and Coulibaly, 2009).
Yet, experience also clearly indicates that it is possible to waste substantial
resources on bloated institutions as well as misguided agricultural interventions and
policies. This is true both for countries and donor agencies. For example, rhetoric
notwithstanding, aid agencies have not yet effectively addressed the tensions, easily
apparent in agriculture, between environmental challenges and their traditional
poverty focus.
In a recent review, Von Braun (2013) finds that the relevant international
institutions focused on agriculture do not deliver the necessary public goods at the
needed scale. He emphasises the need for bold reform and provides a list of seven
international public goods that the global system must aim to provide to function
effectively:
(1) Natural resource management related to biodiversity, water and soils;
(2) Climate change adaptation and mitigation;
(3) Trade and food reserves;
(4) Sound competition policy and standards for foreign direct investment;
(5) International research and innovation in food and agriculture;
(6) Responding to and preventing food and nutrition emergencies;
(7) Trans-boundary food safety and health-related investments and standards.
Concerted action in agriculture and agricultural research no doubt holds many of
the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle required to address the current tradeoffs inherent in
the combined search for economic development and the pressing need to address
environmental challenges. In hopes of better meeting these challenges, some reform
efforts have been ongoing. For example, CGIAR recently reorganized itself around
a series of 15 collaborative research programs. The idea is to bring to bear multiple
perspectives from different centers of expertise on complex problems. The
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challenge of increasing production while preserving local environmental quality in
the context of climate change was a major motivator behind the reforms. Reform
efforts at other important institutions in the agricultural sphere are less advanced.
The general lesson emerging is that a reshaping of the international institutional
for agriculture is indispensable for confronting the multi-faceted challenges of the
21st century. We highlight that these are areas where the state—and by implication
foreign aid—has traditionally been assigned important responsibilities both to
deliver necessary public goods and to provide appropriate frameworks for private
sector activity. Clear articulation of 21st century challenges, along with the
necessary institutional updating, to stakeholders broadly defined, not least taxpayers
in contributing nations, will also be required.
4. The Future Role of Aid in Environment and Climate Change
In considering the future role of aid in environment and climate change, we begin
by reflecting on the potency of development assistance. Subsequently, we outline
five lessons, which in our assessment stand out. They are meant as a roadmap to
the future roles of aid in environment and climate change.
Setting the Level of Ambition Right
“Can aid save the planet?” In our assessment, asking a question such as the one
just put is outright dangerous in relation to foreign aid. It leads (implicitly) to
inflated expectations—and the obvious answer is “No”, for all kinds of reasons
(including aid’s relatively limited size). Yet, this simple one-word response leads in
turn to another (implicit) and equally erroneous impression, namely that there is
nothing aid can do. Aid can, based on past experience, do quite a lot, even if it
cannot by itself save the planet.
Five Key Lessons about Aid’s Future Role
Lesson 1 Development assistance designed principally to achieve welfare
improvements in poor countries remains important. While numerous countries have
graduated to middle-income status, 36 countries remain mired in low-income status.
Strong forces, mainly the shifting geography of poverty and the rise of global
environmental issues, are drawing attention towards middle-income countries. As
will be discussed in Lesson 2, greater attention to middle-income countries is
merited. At the same time, this represents a potential threat to the level of
attention to low-income countries. Insufficient focus on low-income countries may
arise either explicitly, via decisions to directly reduce allocations to those countries,
or implicitly through the allocation of resources to dedicated funding vehicles
whose activities tend to concentrate in middle-income countries. In this context, it
is important to recognize that, after 50 years of assistance, the countries that
continue to be mired in low-income status are likely to be more difficult cases
(Collier, 2008). Each case will have its own particularities and reliance on the
formulas that have been tried over recent decades may not be the best approach.
Alternatively stated, inadequate focus on these more difficult cases would
compromise their growth and development prospects.
With respect to environmental considerations for aid to low-income countries, it
is worthwhile emphasizing that aid is a long-run forward-looking enterprise. Arndt
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et al. (2010, 2015a,b) find that economic growth implications of aid only emerge
after a long period of engagement (up to three decades). Aid is meant to facilitate
recipient countries’ efforts to transform their economic and social structures
towards more desirable outcomes. Decisions made in this process, for example, in
basic economic infrastructure, have lasting implications. The role that
environmental considerations, particularly global environmental considerations,
should play in these decisions is a matter of judgment. There is, for example, ample
justification for substantial emission growth as part of the process of achieving
growth, food security and other socio-economic objectives in low-income countries.
At the same time, an important lesson of the past 50 years is that low-income
countries often grow and become middle-income countries. Under the desired state
of the world, the current set of low-income countries will become middle-income
countries in the context of globally declining GHG emissions and a stabilizing
climate. Given that major investments being made in the near term will influence
economic structure in the long term, environmental considerations rationally enter
current investment calculations in many low-income countries. It would be
unfortunate for the currently low-income countries to arrive at middle-income
status with an economic structure that requires transformation in order to cope with
21st century realities, particularly if more appropriate structures could have
delivered the same development performance. Indeed, one of the few advantages
associated with low-income status is that future economic structure is, in
considerable measure, a matter of choice.
Lesson 2 Notwithstanding Lesson 1, it is desirable that the share of attention that
the aid system devotes to middle-income countries increases without crowding out
resource transfers to the low-income countries. This is driven by (i) the
concentration of absolutely poor people in middle-income countries, (ii) the key
role that middle-income countries must play in combating global environmental
problems and (iii) the needs of middle-income countries for some assistance in
adapting to climate change. As the aid system has accumulated substantial
experience working with countries that are now middle income, it makes sense that
this experience is intelligently deployed to confront new challenges.
Nevertheless, there are important differences between low- and middle-income
countries that aid institutions must address. In particular, in low-income countries,
aid financial flows are frequently macroeconomically very significant. In middle-
income countries, concessional aid flows are almost invariably relatively small in
macroeconomic terms and are highly likely to remain so. Desired development and
environmental goals must be achieved through appropriate policy frameworks and
investment decisions funded principally through private sources or domestic public
finance.
Under these conditions, aid can only hope to play supporting and catalytic roles
that fall under the rubric of soft assistance. Examples of these roles for confronting
environment and development issues include:
• technology development and transfer;
• regulation and regulatory frameworks;
• other policy advice;
• institution building;
• information systems;
• other analysis and technical assistance; and
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• leveraging private flows or taking on some risk in order to encourage private
flows with a view to both expanding the magnitude of the flows and/or
channelling their application to the benefit of lower income households.
Two aspects of a trend towards soft and/or catalytic assistance merit mention.
Because aid, in these contexts, is almost certain to be small relative to the
application of domestic resources, the leverage that aid effectively receives opens
the possibility for very high returns on aid investments. For example, if US$10
million in soft assistance ends up increasing the annual social return on a US$1
billion investment by 1%, then the benefit/cost ratio to the aid is very sizeable.
Second, to the extent that the aid system was designed at all, it was designed with
the objective of helping poor people in poor countries. At its best, this system
worked with domestic institutions in poor countries, which were invariably
characterized by distinctly limited capacity, to develop broad scale packages of
policies, technical advice and finance. In contrast, middle-income countries are a lot
less likely to demand traditional broad scale aid packages that effectively cede a
major role in strategic decision-making to donor capitals. Recipients’ greater
technical capacity combined with the small relative size of aid render these
packages increasingly less necessary and less politically acceptable to recipients.
Even functioning at their best, it is not clear that traditional aid institutions are
properly configured to help middle-income countries confront their interlinked
developmental and environmental challenges.
In other words, institutional inertia threatens to stifle needed shifts in focus.
Moreover, as argued for agricultural institutions, articulation of needs and
associated institutional reforms is also required to ensure stakeholder buy in.
Lesson 3 The role of aid and aid institutions in the provision of global/regional
public goods should be maintained or enhanced. Agriculture presents a particularly
good example (though not the only one). Particularly as part of an effort to reform
and reconfigure international agricultural institutions such that they better respond
to 21st century challenges, there is a strong rationale for enhanced investment in
international agricultural systems. For agriculture, the case for an emphasis on
technology and investments to reduce gaps between actual and potential yields is
particularly strong. Unlike other areas such as power generation, where improved
solar panels are likely to work just as well in Africa as in North America for the
same level of solar radiation, agricultural innovations tend to be strongly location-
specific.4 The spill-overs to developing countries, particularly those in Africa, from
public and private agricultural research in developed countries may be limited.5
Given the critical global role agricultural sectors in developing countries will play in
the first half of the 21st century, there is, as already argued, a convincing rationale
for major investment of aid funds in international agricultural systems.
Other areas with obvious roles for aid include trans-boundary river basin
management, regional growth arrangements including regional power pools and
technology generation, where, as in agriculture, global research advances may not
apply to developing countries (e.g. cook stoves).
Lesson 4 Assist with the financing of the transformations required to confront
environmental issues. There are fundamental rationales behind the design of the
new aid initiatives discussed (REDD+, CDM, GEF and GCF). The world
298 Channing Arndt and Finn Tarp
© 2017 UNU-WIDER. Review of Development Economics Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
community, via the CoP21 Paris agreement and the collective weight of more than
160 country INDCs, has begun putting in place a global mitigation regime. The
REDD+, GEF and GCF institutions are well-positioned to make substantial
contributions to helping developing countries achieve their INDCs. They should be
supported in this objective and evaluated accordingly.6 The development of
appropriate institutional frameworks for emissions trading, as in the CDM, is likely
to take on increasing importance over time hard return.
Lesson 5 While, in principle, aid for information could be categorized under
Lesson 3, it deserves special mention. Aid has long been recognized as a
knowledge-intensive activity. Indeed, institutions such as the World Bank now bill
themselves as “knowledge banks;” and the information needs of developing
countries have underpinned the creation of institutions dedicated to providing these
needs (such as UNU-WIDER).
Two points merit particular mention. First, Lessons 2–4 serve to place even more
emphasis on the role of information collection, organization, analysis and
dissemination. These roles should become even more central in aid efforts as
recognized in the formulation of the SDGs, which has spawned repeated calls for a
data revolution.
Second, looking forward, the desired state of the world envisions that global
GHG emissions peak in the relatively near term and then decline fairly rapidly
thereafter. An adequate monitoring system that independently and credibly tracks
emissions at country levels is necessary for properly assessing progress towards
achieving the emission reductions set forth in country INDCs. Without such as
system, it is hard to see how consistent, long-term emission reductions could be
achieved.
In principle, fossil fuel use is relatively simple to monitor as fossil fuels come
from (or pass through) a few reasonably easily distinguishable points. As noted by
Angelsen (2013), the other principal sources of emissions, agriculture and
deforestation, pose much greater, though certainly not insurmountable,
measurement challenges.7
This auditing task would appear to be indispensable. Historically, aid institutions
have often housed data and auditing tasks together with operating units within the
same agency. There is, in this instance, a good case for creating a new, specialized,
independent and technically competent institution that would credibly monitor and
corroborate country level emissions data in order to properly track emissions at the
global level.
5. Conclusions
Development aid, by itself, cannot ‘save the planet’ and secure much needed and
much desired outcomes in furthering development, poverty reduction and
environmental stewardship. At the same time, the weight of evidence does indicate
that development aid and development institutions do have a track record in
contributing to the realization of development objectives. This is a considerable
achievement given the massive scale of the development challenges that existed
circa 1970. As such, it seems reasonable to believe that development aid and aid
institutions have the potential to become important catalytic actors in achieving
interlinked developmental and global environmental objectives.
However, this aid architecture confronts new issues within a new context. It was
principally designed to assist poor people in poor countries in an era when global
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environmental issues were, at most, a distant glimmer. This same architecture is not
well suited to the new geography of poverty that situates most poor people in
middle-income countries and an era where addressing global environmental change
is widely viewed as one of the defining issues. The five lessons identified are meant
as guides in the necessary restructuring of the international institutional
architecture. Implementation of the complementary policy frameworks is also a
necessary condition. Without restructuring and appropriate complementary policies,
future aid, particularly aid for environmental objectives, risks substantially under-
performing.
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Notes
1. See the list of 17 SDG goals available at http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/
sustainable-development-goals/.
2. See also Arndt et al. (2010), Clemens et al. (2012), Juselius et al. (2013), Mekasha and
Tarp (2013), as well as UNU-WIDER (2014a), which is a comprehensive position paper
providing an up-to-date review of existing aid-growth literature. In more recent literature,
Roodman (2015) disputes the findings of Clemens et al. (2012) and suggests lower returns.
His contribution does not appear in Arndt et al. (2015b) because the data sets he employs
span less than 30 years. In addition, a response to Roodman (2015) can be found in Bazzi
and Bhavnani (2015).
3. While REDD+ is also a form of emissions trading, it is, compared with the CDM, much
less dependent on a liquid market for certified emission reductions as it relies upon broad
institutional agreements across numerous actors. In this sense, the increased demand for
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emission reductions catalyzed by the Paris Agreement may well stimulate activity in
REDD+.
4. While the process of converting sunlight to electricity functions in essentially the same
way in the developed and developing world, developing countries may require additional
innovations in finance because developing countries typically face higher opportunity cost of
capital and the costs of renewable technologies are typically front-loaded. Institutional
structures for power generation and distribution are location-specific and highly relevant to
the pace and nature of technology adoption.
5. For example, one of the most widely used biotechnology innovations in the USA is
herbicide resistant maize. This innovation is of limited value in contexts where very little
herbicide is used.
6. Crowding in of private sector funds is, as noted, critical in this context. Further discussions
on this and other points can be found in UNU-WIDER (2014b).
7. Measurement and verification are equally salient for the preservation and/or expansion of
GHG sinks as envisioned under payments for environmental services.
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